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Summary: Public Enterprises (PE) in Kosovo are of strategic importance for the country, 
employing about 14,000 workers and the impact on the economy over 20% of GDP over the 
past 5 years. Corporate Governance (hence CG) in Kosovo is a new concept and is in the 
process of continuous development and improvement. The aim of the research is to analyse 
the mechanisms of CG and its legal framework in PEs. CG in Kosovo as a result of the 
challenges of transition is closely related to the consolidation of the rule of law, ownership 
structure, as well as professional and institutional capacities. The basic hypothesis is that the 
weaknesses of the CG mechanisms affect the quality of the CG. Methodology: The research 
sample will be 17 NP 100% owned by the government. The research method will be 
combined primary data with secondary ones such as annual reports, analysis of the legal 
framework and mechanisms of CG. For primary data I conducted a survey with key actors in 
the CG. Results of the survey will identify strengths and weaknesses in the nature and 
enforcement mechanisms at CG and in this way to strengthen policy dialogue that will 
identify reform priorities that lead to improved performance CG and economic. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Empirical studies confirm that companies with good CG standard are valued higher in 
financial markets (McKinsey, 2002). Promoting CG has become a global movement 
developing wide array of standards, codes and criteria for evaluation. For investors, one of 
the most important aspects when making investment decisions is the level of implementation 
of the principles of CG (information disclosure, protection of shareholders rights and equal 
treatment of all shareholders and other stakeholders) and profit that provides return on their 
investment. PE has multiple and contradictory objectives, influenced by excessive political 
interference and lack of transparency, considered the main problems facing PE in Kosovo. 
 
2. External mechanisms of CG 
 
External mechanisms include: 1) The market for corporate control 2) legal infrastructure 3) 
protection of small shareholders and 4) Conditions for competition. 
 
2.1 The market for controlling the corporate 
 
One of the most effective mechanisms for corporate control is the managers’ market, which 
forces managers to operate effectively because they can always be replaced by other more 
effective managers. In case of CG in PE of Kosovo, the role of the market for corporate 
control of the company is performed by Board of Directors (hence BD). 
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2.2 Legal and institutional basis   
  
Law on PE (Law no. 03/L-087, 2008), as amended and supplemented on 20.04.2012 (Law 
no. 04/L-111) is a foundation for the form of management, reporting and ownership, for all 
PE’s. According to the law, the Government is obliged to supervise the management of these 
enterprises and report to Assembly on an annual basis. Kosovo's legislation is largely in line 
with the EU because of the considerable technical assistance provided by the United Nations 
(UN) and the EU in recent years. However, the level of implementation of this legislation is 
less advanced. According to the Law on PE, Article 4, item 4.1, all PE’s shall be organized as 
a joint stock company (JSC) in accordance with applicable laws on commercial companies 
(Law no. 02/L-123).  
 
2.3 Protecting the interests of shareholders 
  
Law on PE, Article 13 stipulates that PEs are subject to the same legal treatment as private 
enterprises. Law on PE, Article 12 stipulates that all shareholders shall be treated equitably. 
According to the law, an equal market for all stakeholders is intended, and this is in 
conformity with the principles of the OECD (2005) and it poses a challenge for the 
government to implement it in the future. 
 
3. Internal mechanisms CG 
 
Internal mechanisms of control are: 1) The Board of Directors 2) Compensation of 
Management 3) Concentration of ownership 4) Relationships with stakeholders 5) Financial 
transparency and disclosure of relevant information (corporate reporting). 
  
3.1 Composition of Board of Directors 
 
Law on PE (Law no. 03/L-087) defines the model as a one-tier board, known as the Anglo-
American model. According to the Law on PE, Article 15, paragraph 15.1 the Board of 
Directors (BD) of a PE shall consist of five or seven directors. All directors, except one, shall 
be selected by the government and each such selected director shall have a 3-year term. The 
other director will be Executive Director (ED) of the PE and shall be selected by the Board of 
PE based on Article 21 of this Law. According to the Law on PE, Article 17, paragraph 17.2 
all directors, except the DE, shall be independent. Article 37, paragraph 37.1 stipulates the 
establishment of Policy and Monitoring Unit of the PE (PMUPE) within the Ministry in order 
to support the Minister and the Government in exercising the responsibilities for PE which 
were conferred upon them by this law. In 17 PE analysed, BD counted 97 members, of whom 
six are women (19.6%) and 91 men (93.81%). Based on research findings, only 2 out of 17 
PE distributed dividends for the government, while 15 other PE are not financially viable.  
 
3.2 Remuneration of PE Directors 
   
Law no. 04/L-111 on Amending and Supplementing the Law no. 03/L-087 PE Article 12 (1) 
limits the performance incentive remuneration which is determined after the annual audit of 
the financial statements and the publication of reports on the performance of the regulatory 
offices. This compensation (bonus) is now paid to directors, an amount up to 50% of the 
basic fee referred to in paragraph 2 of this article. Research results points out that BD have 
illegally distributed bonuses before the end of calendar year and without assessing their 
performance. Members of the Board of PE in the past four years gained 3 million on behalf of 
salaries and bonuses (Newspaper Zëri, 09.05.2014).  
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Office of the Auditor General (OAG) in its report (August 2014) found that total 
compensation for members of the BD for the period between 2009 and 2012 was 2,439,710 
€. From this value for BD meetings was € 1,691,304, compensation for € 204.268 audit 
committees, compensation for other committees and retroactive payment € 528.368 payment 
of members of BD € 15.770, whereas bonuses allocated in this period were in the amount of 
€ 1,207,139. Total compensation and bonuses for BD for the period 2009-2012 was € 
3,646,849. From the analysis of the OAG report it can be seen that the total payments to other 
committees from PE for the period 2009-2012 was € 528.368 (OAG, 2014). 
 
3.3 Concentration of ownership in PE 
  
In the case of Kosovo, the ownership structure of PE of Kosovo is focused on only one 
shareholder (the government, as 100% shareholder), which does not imply the existence of 
the market for corporate control, and therefore reflects the composition of BD which has a 
key role in CG of PE. PE in Kosovo continues to have low performance and delay in 
providing quality services to citizens. PE have been consistently followed by a series of 
negative phenomena such as mismanagement, corruption, weak and non-professional boards, 
political interference, non-transparency, having too many staffers and militants of rulers, 
budget deficit, etc. This made  PE not attractive to investors. Kosovo's government has made 
it clear to the introduction of the private sector in these sectors. Privatization of state-owned 
shares in certain PE has moved very slowly, which at the current level of their management 
and financial sustainability means relatively low quality of CG of PE in Kosovo. Moreover, it 
is rightly to assert that the best solution for PE in Kosovo is privatization and most effective 
way to improve the performance of these PE.  
  
3.4 Relations with interest groups 
  
PE should recognize the importance of relations with interest groups, for the sound and 
financially stable companies. State ownership policy should fully recognize the PE 
responsibilities towards stakeholders and lay down demands that they report on relations with 
other stakeholders. It is necessary for PE to continue active cooperation with all stakeholders 
in order to create jobs, prosperity and the preservation of financial stability of the company. 
 
3.5 Reports based on Law on PE 
 
The law obliges all PE to submit every 3 months certain reports. Based on research, from the 
total number of 17 PE analysed, only 13 of them possess internet website. It is also noted that 
the maintenance of existing web-pages is insufficient. Results of the survey show that there 
are few relevant information to current and potential shareholders and other interested parties. 
From 17 PE that were analysed, only nine have published: mission, vision, annual business 
plan, organizational chart, financial statements and independent auditors' report, etc., for 
2010-2013 periods on their website. PMUPE has published annual reports for the 17 PE and 
the external auditor's report on its website for the year 2010-2013 for all PE, but this site is 
poorly maintained and not all the reports can be opened. Whereas in 2014 there is no 
reporting conducted, although the law requires 75 days after the end of the calendar year to 
report to the Assembly.  
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4. Conclusions 
 
Among the achievements of the Kosovo government worth of highlighting is the provision of 
legal and institutional framework, which largely meet the standards and principles of the 
OECD and other international experiences, but their implementation in practice remains a 
challenge. Weak enforcement of legal provisions and non-qualitative supervision of PE 
activity by the shareholder shows that there are delays in the delivery of quality services to 
citizens. It should reflect the positive effects of greater transparency and greater public access 
to information on the operation of the PE. Research analysis shows that the government as a 
shareholder is not that much interested to improve the performance of PE and political 
interference are highly influencing the appointment of directors and management. PE are 
responsible for the procurement of goods and services that are in fact the most corrupted 
practices in terms of tenders abuses by certain political groups and the governors who, 
beyond a shadow of a doubt, are a cancer to the health of PE in Kosovo.  
CG in PE of Kosovo has made progress over time but more efforts should be done and focus 
on enhancing the quality of the board of directors, whose members should be professionally 
trained, have better information about the company's operations, and should have greater 
independence and not be subject to political influence, because strengthening the role of the 
board of directors would allow high efficiency and win the company's reputation. These 
results reflect that the concept of CG in Kosovo is in the beginning stage. It is evolving and 
not well understood or applied. Research results show the need for raising awareness about 
the importance of the CG and its implementation.  
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